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Introduction
Companies sourcing fresh produce globally link local production systems to corporate
strategic outlooks and competitive consumer markets. Contracting out the production of fresh
agricultural product is a widespread and important tool for organising agricultural production
in line with corporate strategies and market demands. This system leads to social and
technical integration of independent farmers into extensive production and marketing
schemes adopted by internationally operating agribusiness. The precise organisational
modality resulting from this form of incorporation and co-ordination often resembles a
muddy mixture of variant institutional perspectives. Analysis of a contract farming scheme in
the Philippines, producing fresh asparagus for the Japanese market, identifies a pallet of
institutional perspectives and discusses what happens when these are incommensurable at
times of production failures or financial pressures (Vellema 2002; 2003). My analysis centres
on variant grower-company interactions in integration, and on growers’ responses to the
imposition of institutional frameworks. Ethnographic investigation points to the capacity of
contractual arrangements to incorporate diverse social relations into the firm’s operations and
strategies.
The mixture of actors included in contract growing schemes makes it difficult to decide
which partners are in effective control of the scheme and how major decisions are made
(Glover 1984). This is especially so because the company has to rely on remote and indirect
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2control. The indirect nature of control makes both the mutual understanding of the actual
arrangement and the reliability and accountability of each partner crucial for the evolution of
a production scheme (Clapp 1988). The hypothesis investigated here is that the co-operation
between company and growers can sustain a profitable and stable enterprise, but it essentially
depends on the capability to incorporate divergent interests and variant cultural notions of
solidarity into one organisational framework functional to production and marketing. 
Theoretical perspectives
In general, scholars in agrarian and rural sociology tend to concentrate on what goes on
outside the ‘globalizing corporation’. The analytical discussions want to understand the
external prescription of farming activities or, in contrast, the diversity in the relations that
connect global companies and local farmers. The new political economy of agriculture
literature, which has a strong focus on the globalization of agro-food systems, examines
contract growing through the lens of industrial restructuring (Friedland 1994). It sees contract
growing as an integral element of the new international division of labour in agriculture
(Raynolds et al. 1993) and new patterns of trade and changes in retailing (McMichael 1992;
Bonanno et al. 1994). Much attention is given to the coercive character of contracting
(Gerther 1991). Supposedly, the administrative hierarchies of international agribusiness,
which are tightly integrated with the demands of finance capital and which are responsive to
international competition, subsume activities of growers (Rickson and Burch 1996). In the
above arguments globalization is basically understood as a macro-level process, shaped by
the technological, economic and regulatory features of transnational production of food. This
strong focus on the outcome of the historical transformation of agriculture fails to examine
how technicians, growers and managers construct organisational transformation and technical
change in a specific set of social relations that leads to the variation in contract farming
schemes (Little and Watts 1994, Grossman 1998). Hence, we have to examine the empirical
manifestations of globalization in the workplace, i.e. farmers’ fields, more critically (cf.
MacKenzie 1992). 
Actor-oriented studies in rural sociology alert us to the dangers of exaggerating the potency
and driving force of external institutions and interests (Marsden et al. 1990, 1992; Long and
Long 1992). These studies emphasise the heterogeneity of farmers’ strategies as well as
diversity in perceptions, conflicts and cultural histories. Norman Long (1994, 1996) argues
that, although agriculture is global in scope, local networks of groups and associations react
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represents a specific configuration of interlocking actors’ projects, which is generated by
encounters, negotiations and accommodation (Long and van der Ploeg 1994). Actor-oriented
studies identify variation, but risk over-playing agency and intention at the expense of
broader organisational or technological features (Leach and Fairhead 2000). The evolution of
contract growing schemes is not simply a story of dominance and resistance but involves the
modes of co-operation between people, the type of governance and the imposition of rules,
and the institutional configurations connecting people and technology. 
I conclude from the above that little has been said about how certain strategies are developed
and how specific organisational arrangements are deployed to enable companies to develop
and exploit competitive advantage (Pritchard 2000). This lacuna may lead to a simple
portrayal of corporate engineering (Pritchard and Fagan 1999). The focus of this study is on
the interconnectedness of production activities and forms of governance for co-ordination,
and, likewise, on the combination of capabilities that transcends the boundaries of firm and
farm (cf. Coombs and Battaglia 1998, cf. King 1992). Therefore, I am less concerned with the
origin of growing schemes or with the motivations for offering contracts in the context of
globalization. My interest is in questions about co-ordinating procedures and policing
instruments inside the institutional configuration of contract growing schemes (Wolf et al.
2001) and I pay special attention to the regulations and restrictions ordered by the company
(cf. Coombs et al. 1992). This study aims to unravel the complexity and the locus of control,
realising that economic behaviour is embedded in a network of social relations and that farm-
level decision-makers are key to ventures such as contract farming (Porter and Phillips-
Howard 1997, Welsh 1997). In contract growing schemes this implies a precise study of the
input and prescription of technology, the surveillance and monitoring of productive activities,
the measurement of quality, and the sharing and computation of revenues (Wolf et al. 2001).
These issues expose what happens inside the organisation. 
The institutional and organisational configurations of contract farming are extremely varied.
There are many ways in which companies answer the question how to organise production,
both technically and socially. Within the organisational framework of contract growing, both
company and growers manoeuvre to improve their own positions, and individuals within the
two groups pursue individual goals and strategies, which change over time (cf. Porter and
Phillips-Howard 1994: 320). As a result, the actual behaviour of the different parties is an, at
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Therefore, it is relevant to find an appropriate framework for understanding this particular
institutional modality of agricultural production. I use neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as a
heuristic device for mapping the diverse organisational formations wherein management and
growers interact, and for describing the evolving managerial, administrative and working
relations in contract growing. This exercise results in a characterisation of organisational
cultures specifying the hybrid nature of contract growing schemes. 
Neo-Durkheimian cultural theory, or grid-group theory (Douglas 1987, 1996), offers a fairly
straightforward framework to categorise organisational behaviour in contract growing
schemes. Essentially, grid-group theory distinguishes four social formations or institutional
orders as the social and cultural context of individual behaviour. These formations are
constructed by measuring different types of individual and collective responses to
incorporation (social involvement or group) and imposition (regulation or grid) (Thompson et
al. 1990). The group and grid dimensions can be either strong or weak; for example a
hierarchical formation represents high levels of integration and rule-based behaviour. Grid-
group theory brings out some of the varying and contradictory attitudes about who to blame,
how to assess risks or how to put matters right. In my analysis, building on Mary Douglas’
work, behaviour of growers and company employees and managers is nested in institutional
modalities: contract farming combines measures of regulation with modes of social
involvement. Therefore, institutional modalities include elements of society, which cross the
boundaries of a corporate scheme.
Contract farming in the agro-food complex
Agro-industrialisation and global sourcing have fostered prominent and widespread
institutional and technological changes in the sphere of agricultural production. These include
the rise of contractual exchange in the place of spot markets, increased attention to product
quality and safety, and the change in conduct of productive skills, know-how and technical
choice (cf. Reardon and Barret 2000). Closing down of many marketing boards, changing
consumption patterns and regulatory requirements, and expansion of international trade in
fresh produce increased interest in contract growing as an alternative arrangement for
agricultural trade through (deregulated) spot-markets (cf. Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). In
addition, in land-scarce situations, such as Southeast Asia, contract-growing schemes are
responsive to existing patterns of land distribution, inducing new ways to construct access to
5land and to develop new ways of organising production. In Asian agriculture, largely based
on fragmented smallholdings managed by independent producers with little bargaining power
in markets, contract farming entails a new form of institutional change (FAO, 2002a, b).
Contract farming links farmers both to multinational firms, either retail distributors, shippers
and producers of fresh produce, or input supply firms, and to consumers, either in foreign
markets or in domestic markets. This case study examines the production of fresh, premium
asparagus exported to Japan and contracted out by a subdivision of Dole Philippines. Dole’s
Philippine operations are mainly concentrated in Southern Mindanao and involve the
production of pineapples and bananas, and, recently, a diverse package of high value crops
largely marketed in Japan. In the early 1990s, softening prices for its major products in
international markets - bananas and pineapples - and the Japanese appetite for fresh
vegetables encouraged the company to venture into competitive fruit and vegetable markets.
Increased marketing efforts led to the opening of a series of distribution centres. The
company’s terminals in Japan co-ordinated the supply of fresh products by several divisions
in different parts of the world. The company’s way to establish a position in Japan was to sell
quality asparagus spears at prices significantly lower than its competitors. A crop
diversification programme of the company’s Philippine operations, with asparagus as the
major crop, was an important step to secure the supply of high-quality produce. Japan is by
far the largest import market for fresh asparagus in Asia, and it is one of the largest importers
of this product in the world. In the 1990s, the Philippines succeeded to become a leading
exporter of asparagus to Japan. Globally, the Philippines is still a small producer of green
asparagus, compared to the United States, Peru and Mexico (RAP, 1995), but in the Japanese
market the Philippines has become a major competitor for the leading producers.
In the company's strategy, contract farming served as a tool to socially and institutionally
integrate independent farmers into agribusiness complexes, by introducing new crops,
creating marketing facilities, and co-ordinating the farming practices with the harvesting and
processing operations of an agro-industrial corporation. By farming out the actual production,
the company gives up direct control over farm management and over land. The role of
contracts is to introduce predictability into agribusiness operations, to motivate performance
and to enhance quality control, and to reallocate financial risks and rewards (Wolf et al.
2001). A production contract requires the producer to deliver a particular crop on a given date
for a price commonly specified in advance. The contract contains detailed instructions
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obligations, in terms of quality, volume or production method. The company frequently
exercises some control at the point of production through advice and assistance from its
technicians and extension agents. Hence, contracts regulate the production of farmers to a
certain extent. However, this study suggests that contracts are mostly incomplete and are not
able to cover unforeseen deficiencies and problems in production. Typical contracts are
incomplete; not all events can be anticipated and rationalised in a formal contract and the
contract must function in a changing organisational environment (Rousseau 1995). Due to the
absence of complete contracts, managerial and technological interventions are inevitable in
contract growing. These interventions reveal concrete mechanisms constituting the social
relations of production in contract farming. 
Therefore, the analysis of integration of independent farm enterprises should not be limited to
formal and associative factors. Contract farming schemes can better be envisaged as a
political coalition, rather than a unitary rational body (MacKenzie 1992). It also suggests that
contract farming can best be understood as an evolving institutional arrangement, which
engineers both the political and organisational features of integration. Thus, contract farming
can better be understood as a rolling set of adjustments, and not as a search for a perfect
accounting or technological system that excludes any uncertainty.
The institutional culture of integration and accountability
The asparagus growing scheme was embedded in the regional political economy of Southern
Mindanao. In the early 20th century, Muslim communities largely occupied the region. Since
World War II, settlers received land titles from the Philippines government and participated
in an orchestrated development project. The stream of migrants persisted and eventually
Christian settlers formed a majority in the region. In addition, the establishment of a vast
pineapple plantation attracted large numbers of workers and exhausted the land frontier in
this area. Since the 1990s, mixed populations of independent farmers have become
increasingly linked with agribusiness companies. In this context, Dole’s newly established
contract growing scheme incorporated a variety of existing landholdings, which implied the
incorporation of both Muslim communities and settlers villages.1 Local brokers and the
company frontline workers were key actors in this process of integration by global
corporations and local farming communities.
7Analysing the social character of communities affected by the contract growing scheme leads
on to the question of how an organisation works when collecting such a variety of growers,
with correspondingly divergent moralities and political cultures. In theory, all contract
growers, large or small, Muslim farmer or Christian settler, are subject to the same level of
integration, as well as the same loss of control. However, companies have to adopt strategies
to include variant local social formations, and combine these with various forms of corporate
control. This also appears to be their key problem in managing and organising contract
growing. As it turns out, the prevalent assumption -presenting the contract growing scheme
as one uniform organisation with one dominant culture- seems to be invalid. It then becomes
crucial to comprehend the way in which social order is constituted in a particular institutional
configuration. 
Integration shapes the organisational cultures in which company and growers interact, either
through a process of brokerage and attraction by reciprocity, through a process of venturing
into a new enterprise and cultivating a business mentality, or through a process of
institutional capture by administrative controls and performance review. It is also important
to realise that food provision systems consist of differently behaving groups with distinct and
specialised tasks and with different perceptions on how technology should function or
production be arranged (Hughes 1987). The particular social organisation and distribution of
tasks may constrain the endeavour of both companies and growers to combine their efforts in
solving complex and integrated technological problems (cf. Hutchins 1995). Organisational
variety allows growers and company to pick a form of interaction that suits their current
interests. As a consequence, contract growing entails a lot of strategizing, as well as
numerous collisions between divergent perceptions on the actual content of the social
relationship. An unspecified mixture of coercion and control, of persuasion and conventions
and of converging self-interests fabricates the institution of contract farming.2 This is
reflected in the mutual persuasion to earn a living in a particular type of organisation
(Douglas et al. 1998).
The following section attempts to see the strategizing of company and growers against their
organisational background and their institutionally imposed roles. An essentialist view on the
social position of contract growers does not help understand the realities of this scheme. The
following describes a variety of ways in which groups come and hold together; such as
accounting for actions, loyalty to an organisation, social responsibility, and trust in the
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examined from a neo-Durkheimian perspective, are summarised in table 5.1. This table flags
the existence of various perspectives on incorporation into a bounded social group, and it
suggests various responses to the imposition of rules and conventions. The four cultural
biases, situated in social relations and organisational backgrounds, seem to capture the
different institutional perspectives, or modes of social engagement:
 Fatalist culture Contrived randomness and reciprocity
 Hierarchical culture Administrative control and transparency
 Individualistic culture Entrepreneurial partnership and performance
 Enclavist/egalitarian culture Brokerage, delegated negotiation and obstruction
It is important to realise that these perspectives do not necessarily coincide with specific and
bounded actors groups. Growers can readily shift from one perspective to another. Moreover,
company management can employ different management styles, responding to these
organisational styles in concert. Hence, the exercise is not to categorise growers, but is meant
to pinpoint conflicting views and to make these perceptions part of the social relations and
institutional cultures growers and company employees are involved in. Moreover, the notion
of institutional thinking also helps identifying the range options for solving problems or
addressing social tensions in an organisation. In this approach, the internal level of
organisation is presented as a product of circumstance; in contract growing local social
history is combined with the corporate environment. 
In the following, I will summarise the actions of both growers and company management in
cultural theory terms. I will start off with growers, who strongly depend on personal ties with
company personnel and who, consequently, reproduce traditional patronage relationships in
their interaction with the company. Subsequently, I will relate the hierarchical bureaucratic
character of financial and administrative transactions to the actions of a number of
‘organised’ growers demanding transparency of accounting procedures. However, the result
of contract growing is also that farmers become more entrepreneurial and individualistic.
Therefore, growers, for example, expect a business mentality in negotiations with the
company, especially since the implementation of a review process underscores the business-
oriented idea of compensation for effort. Finally, I will describe the actions of delegated
9negotiators in Muslim communities, whose power is located within a bounded local
community, but whose authority is challenged by the consequences of the contract. These
brokers are assigned to respond, on behalf of their constituency, to challenges and
unfavourable terms set by the company.
Table 5.1: Dimensions of and responses to incorporation and imposition in contract growing 
(A summary of neo-Durkheimian cultural theory)
Fatalist culture
Contrived randomness and reciprocity
 Acceptance of uncertain procedures and
unpredictable rewards;
 Stratified individuals alive at margins of
organisational patterns;
 Individual bargaining outside formal reward
system and exploit personalised
relationships in situation of limited choice;
 Permanently failing organisations and
perception that economic survival is not
linked to performance;
 Clash of cultures; close territories and put
blame on the system.
 Minimum anticipation and lack of disposition
to take responsibility: ad-hoc responses to
events.
Hierarchical culture
Administrative control and transparency
 Elaborate organisational apparatus of
controllers and overseers at all levels of the
organisation; greater managerial grip;
 Division of labour and differentiated roles;
confidence in organisational competence;
 Excessive trust in technical expertise and
tight bureaucratic procedures;
 Binding prescription and inability to learn;
error inducing organisation;
 Fairness consists of equality before the law;
conceal evidence of failure.
Individualistic culture
Entrepreneurial partnership and performance
by competitive individuals
 Freedom to enter and to exit transactions;
 Relationship is subject to negotiation and
dependent on the ability of individuals to
shape their work as they choose;
 Boundaries are provisional and failure stems
from lack of co-operation;
 Unchecked private gain at the expense of
what is supposed to be a collective
enterprise;
 Pursuit of personal rewards; dependent on
effort.
Enclavist or egalitarian culture
Brokerage and delegated negotiation
 Sending a delegate as negotiator; strong
relations between group members;
 Shared opposition to outside world keeps
group bounded together;
 Respond collectively to opportunities
provided by company;
 Failing negotiation and unwillingness to
accept higher authority to break deadlocks;
lack of ability to resolve disputes and feuds;
Source: Fieldwork observations and drawing on Hood (1996, 2000), Mars (1982), Douglas
(1987).
Note: The vertical grid-axis represents the degree to which life and behaviour of individuals is
circumscribed by conventions and rules or by externally imposed prescriptions; it reflects the
extent to which space for individual negotiations is reduced. The horizontal group-axis
represents the degree to which individual choice is constrained by group choice; it reflects the
extent to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by the notion of solidarity of the group he
or she belongs to.
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Fatalist culture: contrived randomness and reciprocity
When initiating the scheme, the company had to persuade growers by showing that its offer
was promissory, that it was bound to future action. Under such conditions, provision of credit
and strategic uses of advances and other payments to secure loyalty through personal
obligation were among strategies open to the company (Clapp 1988). At first sight it looks as
if growers and company are affiliates in a production chain, in which one party sells its
produce to the marketing agent. However, the marketing or production contracts per se did
not play a decisive role in the relationship between growers and company. Most growers told
me that they spend no more than 2 minutes in the office of the company’s ‘customers
relations officer’ both reading and signing the contract, which comes down merely to placing
a signature on a piece of paper supposedly distributed to growers at a later stage.
At the outset of the scheme, brokers had played a key-role in the communities for several
years. Brokers strongly contributed to discussion among growers about feasibility and risk of
negotiations, about levels of income acceptable to farmers and about the levels of profitability
the business aspired to. Usually, they acted as mouthpiece for a group of growers, and many
gained experiences in local politics or as professionals in companies, or in the army. These
powerful growers, acting as brokers, were also able to access company officials in their
offices and partially negotiate the outcome of accounting.3 Some rich growers used their
personal relations to obtain contracts for hauling asparagus. The company also rewarded their
political effort, for example, by compensation for experiments in their farms.
In addition to seeking support of local allies, technicians illicitly distributed rewards among
dependent growers, such as increased labour budgets or specific attention to production
problems in certain farms. In the corporate hierarchy, technicians, as frontline workers, were
essential to maintain the relationship of trust with growers. Technicians evaluated a grower’s
ability to repay non-operational advances for educational or health purposes. In this system,
growers without personal ties to technicians, and to a lesser extent to company officials, had a
weak bargaining position; others expected to benefit from inviting technicians,
superintendents or staff as godparent to the baptisms or weddings of their children. 
Growers claimed to have shown a lot of confidence in the company by trusting their land to
the venture; company employees actively nourished the idea of a personal partnership to
sustain this level of confidence. During so-called friendship seminars, growers and company
personnel were brought together to discuss problems with the idea to avoid polarisation and
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to maintain good working relations. However, when the company, due to financial pressures
and declining quality levels, decided to review the individual performance of growers it ran
into collision with leading figures in two of the Muslim communities who took extreme
measures in their negotiations with the company. They translated their disapproval of the
formal rewarding system into obstruction, and isolated themselves from the scheme.
Company trucks were no longer allowed to pass by their fields and technicians felt
threatened. These growers assumed an isolationist or fatalist position (according to the grid-
group scheme), illustrated by a technician’s description of the situation:
A small number of growers do not bother about the future anymore. Many of them have no
hope left they will ever be able to pay their debts. They spend their budgets on other things
or delay payments to workers, which, of course, had a strong impact on production. These
are the ones making trouble. The majority of the growers, however, realise that asparagus is
their life; that improvements have been realised due to asparagus production.
Characteristic of the troublesome villages was that not one single family was of overriding
importance. Several factions constituted the community, and in case of conflict, entire
kinship networks became involved, but not necessarily the whole community. Nevertheless,
obstruction of operational affairs and the isolationist stance taken by a number of kinship
networks affected all growers located in the area. Dealing with such a complicated social
matter was beyond the capacity of company technicians and officials. After several attempts
to mediate, company management decided to leave it to the community to solve these
problems; technicians were no longer allowed to enter the area and most operations were
cancelled. For the company, these dissident cultures are hard to deal with, and there are few
grounds for reconciliation. Due to this failure in social engineering, the company left the
handling of conflicts to the community leaders. 
The performance review undermined existing vertical links binding growers to office-holders
or technicians, which raised expectations in regard to services and security (cf. Scott 1972).
In Philippine culture, this raises the question whether a contract is, in fact, a transaction of
reciprocal obligation. In addition to the company’s efforts in contracting farmers, particularly
when offering credit facilities and personal favours, this attitude suggest a willingness to
replace a traditional patronage relationship with new personalised relationships.4 This
coincides with a widely observed characteristic of interactions in Philippine culture, namely a
personal orientation to the world (Pertierra 1997). Hence, in many conversations, farmers
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suggested that signing a contract implied the existence of new forms of reciprocity and
redistribution, in order to fulfil the company’s social obligations (cf. Hollnsteiner 1973). 
The company’s social obligation towards growers was most explicit in its relationship with
persons in strategic positions, who acted as intermediaries for the growers and company,
fixing social problems. These persons were often able to turn brokerage into an economic-
cum-political activity (cf. McCoy 1994). More ambivalent was the company’s attitude
towards cultural expressions of reciprocity in the case of individual growers. Individual
growers settled for small concessions, such as non-operational advances, but they had to deal
with numerous gatekeepers inside the company’s structure. To achieve some security through
interdependence, growers cultivated a personal network of alliances for strategic purposes
(Pertierra 1997). 
When the production scheme evolved, growers were increasingly confronted with impersonal
institutions and objective financial norms enforced by remotely known functionaries.
Increasingly, management rewarded efficiency, and placed less value on personal ties. New
company regulation and control began to constrain growers’ behaviour and growers’ resisted
by breaking the rules. Eventually, reciprocal relations proved to be inadequate to govern the
new modes of interaction beyond the boundaries of the village (cf. Pertierra 1995). It became
obvious that the actual functioning of a contract growing scheme largely depended on its
organisational features, and its linkages to other parts of the corporate structure, as we shall
see in the following.
Hierarchical culture: administrative control and transparency of financial measures
In the beginning of the scheme, trust between growers and company resulted from applying a
particularist principle. However, rising labour costs, and declining productivity and lower
quality levels, triggered interventions in which financial figures and accounting procedures
proved to be decisive. Additionally, the company decided to abandon growers because it was
not prepared to ‘subsidise’ poor-performing growers. Accounting became a tool in reviewing
and re-organising the contract farming system. The resulting strict financial control and
performance reviews presuppose an application of universal principles (Jönssen 1996: 109).
A striking outcome of this shift in managerial style was that the social role of community
leaders and brokers in the production scheme altered. Emphasising this shift, the new
manager told growers that he no longer looked at who they were; only performance and costs
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mattered in managerial decisions. Privileges and benefits were gradually cut-off. Obviously,
this left no space for showing gratitude or consideration for growers who had played a
stimulating role in the early phases of the venture. Thus the company resorted to management
styles which contrasted to the previous experiences of growers. 
Due to the company’s decision not to invest directly in agricultural production, other
contractual agreements than the production contract co-shaped the institutional logic of this
growing scheme. Far away from the actual farm, a semi-public development bank and a
government-owned guarantee funds reached an agreement with the company to become
engaged in this export-oriented project. A crucial element in this engagement was the
provision of loans for farm development, and the opening of a credit line for the operational
expenses of growers’ associations. The presidents of these growers’ associations signed the
basic agreement for the operation -the financing agreement between association, bank,
company and guarantee fund. The specific terms of the various contracts were hardly
discussed with either associations or growers; the several government institutions involved
primarily supported the idea of modernisation, but lacked a clear vision about how to set
specific terms and obligations, or, for example, how to introduce a transparent quality-
incentive system. 
Of overriding importance for the organisational and social dynamic in this scheme was the
fact that the company was assigned as collecting agent for the bank. In contrast to the work of
the agricultural department, managers and financial staff had no direct involvement in
agricultural production. For them, accounting information was an end to monitor the
company’s profitability and the financial figures were crucial in defending the outcome and
the future of the operations in front of top-management, representatives from headquarters,
and in the end, company shareholders. Understandably, a typically instrumental interest in
production dominated these spheres of the corporate structure (cf. Roberts and Scapens
1985). 
Consequently, its role as bank-agent turned the company’s financial department into a key-
player in the financial affairs between growers, associations, bank and company. Its
responsibility was to deduct from the asparagus sales proceeds the amortisation, bank charges
and production costs, and to remit the amount collected to the bank. In addition, it fixed cash
proceeds and declared excess payments, which constituted the actual reward for growers’
effort. The separation of spheres of action -in particular those of financial transactions and
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productive actions- seriously affected the original ways through which trust and loyalty was
maintained. Increasingly, individual accounts of growers took over the role of personalised
bargaining and social interaction; administrative hierarchy displaced the potential for
reciprocity. 
For growers it was not easy to decide how to act in these circumstances. Far-reaching
integration into a corporate hierarchy suggests that collective bargaining is a convenient way
to change terms and outcomes of the arrangement. However, growers basically viewed
themselves as individual entrepreneurs who made a deal with a company. Hence, many
growers strongly disagreed with the implementation of uniform policies, which did not take
account of the differences between individual performances. Moreover, in this particular
growing scheme no formal bargaining mechanisms had been established. Representative
farmers’ organisations, i.e. the associations, were largely driven by the requirements of the
finance agreements with the bank, and the associations had little autonomy in decision-
making (Clapp 1994). Moreover, I observed several organisational and political processes
obstructing collective bargaining. Several efforts had been made to organise a federation,
which would be in the position to bargain with the company on behalf of the growers’
associations. However, this initiative received little support, both from the side of the
company, and from the side of individual growers. Company management even tried to limit
the role of existing associations or co-operatives by decentralising technical discussion to
groups at field level, under the supervision of technicians. This process eroded the authority
of association in the fields of finance and production. Moreover, interactions between
growers and company technicians were usually individualised, which undermined collective
action. In asparagus growing, there was no co-operative body acting as an intermediary
organisation, mediating the power relationship between buyer and grower and defusing
conflict (Little 1994, Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). The associations in this scheme did
not provide a venue for negotiations with the company. On the contrary, both association
presidents and individual growers usually preferred to negotiate their individual interests and
rewards.5 
Individualistic culture: entrepreneurial partnership and performance
The contradictory situation in contract growing is that a contract readily locates growers
outside the institutional and bureaucratic hierarchy of the company, while company
management still has to find a way to construct control. The need for innovative and flexible
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corner cutting operators on the one hand, particularly technicians and brokers, and the need to
maintain rules, on the other, represents dual dilemmas for organisations based on
technological intensification and integration of distinct parties. Although growers view
themselves as business partners, there is, nevertheless, a strong group dimension to the
scheme.
In principle, however, the company perceived the relationship between growers and itself as a
mutual dependency of two independent and equal business partners participating in a
successful enterprise. In this approach towards the problems in asparagus, the company was
persistently building a consensus around how to manage farms efficiently, in partnership with
growers. Together with growers, the company tried to construct a workplace for growing
asparagus. Growers were told to be a good employer; it was suggested they were “to lead by
example, to encourage workers and give incentives, to make hard decision but to be soft on
people, to be tender and loving as a person, and to pay salaries on time”. As business farmers,
growers had to become employers accountable to hired workers. 
However, this view is not univocal. Sometimes growers approved this presentation, with its
emphasis on a business deal, and indeed acted as business partners negotiating for better
terms and higher prices. More often, however, growers, technicians and managers acted and
negotiated within their pre-scheme solidarity, to some extent ignoring the institutional
conditions of the contractual arrangement. 
The review process induced increased individual bargaining and, sometimes, rivalry between
growers. Many growers increasingly acted as individual business farmers, and problems with
the company were rarely solved collectively.6 Also company management gave the
impression to stick to business in its association with growers. The idea of a business-like
partnership appeared on several occasions. In the feasibility study, in the various Memoranda
of Agreement or Production Contracts, and in the Financial Agreements, a common notion of
the contractual relationship is present -all participants involved in production, processing, and
marketing of the asparagus are defined as separate and independent entrepreneurs. Company
and bank adopted a representation of the contract, which transformed socially unequal
partners into ‘political and social equals’. 
For these ‘business farmers’, a disappointing result of the review process, however, was the
absence of an opportunity to negotiate a better business deal: buying prices increased
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marginally and production costs rose continuously. This was difficult to balance by an
enhanced effort by individual growers. Some growers were willing to exit the scheme.
Simultaneously, company management reinforced the importance of performance measures
in terms of which individuals are evaluated; participation in the scheme became conditional
and removal from the organisation was a possibility. Additionally, the company’s financial
department presented facts and figures as objective measurements, generating an apparently
inescapable and indisputable image of the results of organised activity. 
Managerial practice was fragmented and sequential and did not reform an organisation from
the bottom up (cf. Wildavsky and Hammond 1965). Most of the action was oriented towards
the justification of a small number of incremental changes in isolated expenses, such as
labour or fertilisation. Company management did not review a wide range of alternative
expenditures, nor did it investigate thoroughly the consequences of proposed budgetary and
expenditure changes. Interventions were presented merely in terms of changes of existing
budgets and earlier commitments. A major target for the calculations was making growers
aware of the organisation’s goals and standards (Bougen 1994). The cultivation programme,
on the other hand, was not reviewed from the ground up. 
Growers disliked the change in the relation between physical effort and reward and they
discredited the company’s status as the technical expert in a risky enterprise. Furthermore,
growers expressed great discontent with the practice of accounting. From the point of view of
the growers, the accounting system failed to create transparency in the numerous transactions
between company, bank and grower. Additionally, growers had little knowledge of
accounting procedures inside the company, which led to mistrust and suspicion. Although the
company might not be bent on cheating growers as a matter of policy, errors and
malversations in the accounting system eroded growers’ confidence in the whole operations.
Opportunistic behaviour by employees created an atmosphere that growers were being
cheated by the company, which did not contribute to a sustained relationship of trust (Jaffee
1994). Accounting graduates among the growers claimed that “accounting-wise the company
is not transparent”. Understandably, this observation made growers reflect on the reward
system they were part of:
Small farmers need to know not only that they gain financially from the contract enterprise,
but also that they are not being cheated out of further profits by company manoeuvring
(Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997: 227). 
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Clashes over the validity of financial figures, misapplied accounting and embezzlement
forced the company to organise its relationship with growers very carefully. For that reason,
the company balanced between imposing hierarchical relations on institutionally captured
growers and establishing a well-matched relation with independent business farmers (who
might be regarded as individualists). A grower pointed to duality in the organisation: 
I do not think the company wants to cheat as matter of policy because in business you give a
fair share to your partner. The problem is that the financial system did not make asparagus
growing a business; they created an employer-employee relation.7
As a result of the lack of transparency concerning accounting procedures and financial
records, the operation bogged down. Moreover, growers complained about the lack of respect
shown by company personnel and the obstructive role of various gatekeepers inside the
company. This left growers with the feeling that nobody in the company was prepared to risk
his/her neck for a real solution to declining profitability and productivity. Likewise, the lack
of authority over the financial department reinforced the production manager’s inability to
counter distrust in the scheme. Justification to improve economic performance, e.g.
rehabilitation or investments, may have had little influence against a powerful budget-cutting
drive. So, hierarchically imposed financial measures resulted in a declining confidence in
efficiency and integrity of the company. As a result, entrepreneurial growers were inclined to
leave the scheme. However, financial bonds kept them attached to the scheme. This situation
led to fierce resistance to the outcome of signing a contract. In effect, the company found
itself unable to bridge between hierarchical and individualist solidarity.
Enclavist or egalitarian culture: brokerage and delegated negotiation 
To some extent, the process of integration took place at a different pace in the Muslim
communities. A peculiar and stable feature of the Muslim communities involved in the
scheme was the leading role of political leaders, or datus, as spokespersons for their
constituency. Most leaders I interviewed combined a vision on modernisation and
entrepreneurship with a positive attitude towards business investments in their communities,
even by foreign corporations (cf. Wertheim 1978). The company relied on these leaders to
gain access to the villages and to cut deals with individual landowners. Their collaboration
created the foundation for the development of commercially oriented growers of export
crops. In the organisational set-up of the production scheme, the company was not able to
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disregard these brokers. Although individual growers were contracted, these local leaders
took care of most communication and negotiation. Muslim leaders explicitly nurtured ideas
of justice and social equality; their sense of propriety was that people in their constituency,
both growers and workers, were entitled to livelihood and dignity (cf. Kerkvliet 1986,
Hollnsteiner 1973). As a consequence, the brokers had to defend both their individual
interests as well as collective interests in cases of failure or conflict. For the company, this
contradictory form of representation turned out to be a burdensome aspect of the social
character of the growing scheme.
Hence, especially in the Muslim villages, the way to compromise was a community affair. A
diverse group of growers and workers belonged to the constituency of one single family. This
family was assigned to negotiate on behalf of the group. Much depended on the position
taken by local leaders; as local politicians they were obliged to negotiate social justice and
redistribution of benefits on behalf of their constituency. Political leaders worried about the
future of workers and small growers, a majority of their constituency and voters.8 In these
communities, almost all communication between company and growers passed through the
brokers or spokespersons. Brokers, or delegated negotiators, continuously played a decisive
role in responding to changing opportunities presented by management. Such a self-
governing group was able to take a firm stand in negotiations with the company. However, it
was difficult to make a breach in the company; their organisational capabilities did not fit the
corporate hierarchical structure. Moreover, in cases of conflict, brokers may, for individual or
collective reasons, decide to shift to an isolated position and obstruct further incorporation
into the corporate structure.
Conclusions 
This study’s inquiry centres on organisational variety and evolving definitions of
management functions, as features of a system of vertical integration. The hybrid nature of
contract farming described as the combination of hierarchical forms of administration and
entrepreneurial attitudes towards small-scale production, the mixture of outsourcing
productive activities and hands-on supervision by company technicians, or the prescription of
technology packages and the need for skilful management of farming by independent
growers. 
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The evolution of management practices and working relations in this particular scheme shows
that the concept of contract farming cannot be limited to a formal understanding of the
relationship between company and grower -a firm requesting a group of farmers to produce
high value crops, which the first party then sells. On the contrary, it suggests that contract
farming can best be understood as an evolving institutional arrangement, which engineers
both the social and organisational features of integration and the management of farm work
and technology on dissimilar landholdings. It argues that variations in ideas about how to
organise production-related activities is a recurrent and constant issue in contract growing. 
I observed four modes of control and regulation, acting as interdependent social practices
receiving variable emphasis during the evolution of the scheme (see table 2 for a synopsis of
different managerial perspectives present in the company). In these organisational formats,
growers and company were held together differently. Firstly, building personalised
relationships constructed the idea of partnership in a new enterprise. Secondly, the
administrative and financial inclusion of growers gave logic to an extensive corporate
administrative hierarchy. Thirdly, the process of review of performance rooted in attempts to
raise productivity levels gave rise to subtle forms of competition and a move towards
individualised bargaining. And, finally, the brokerage of a social compromise led, in more
extreme cases, to abandonment and obstruction. These organisational forms function
separately and concurrently in a single framework. 
Table 2: Forms of regulation and control in contract farming (adapted from Hood 2000)
Mutuality
 Emphasise partnership and sustain familiarity
 Reward local brokers for commitment
 Reciprocal processes of interaction as solution
to management problems
 Unpredictable patterns of decision-making and
supervision
 
Hierarchy
 Strengthen monitoring and performance
review
 Conscious oversight and inspection embedded
in ladder of authority
 Formal power to pronounce on disputes or
complaints 
 Command action and prescribe farming
practices
Competition
  Make growers responsive to reward
 Improve technical performance of individual
farms
 Outsourcing of all activities
 Decentralisation of growers’ association
Reduce involvement in productive activities 
Brokerage
 Broker social compromise and negotiate with
collective
 Rely on group to check behaviour of
individuals
 Abandon area and elude negotiator
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This messy mixture of management styles can be seen as an unintended outcome of how
contractual relations are embedded in local societies, rather than as intentional nurturing of
different institutional cultures. So, contract growing can be a robust organisational form
because it is able to incorporate cultural and organisational diversity into its constitution. This
situation was, however, not the way in which the scheme was supposed to work. The
presented evidence shows that companies hunt around among management styles.
Disappointment over the capacity of one approach to deliver satisfactory results leads to
increasing support for one of the other options. Moreover, in problematic situations
management tends to opt for extreme measures, such as imposing hierarchy or pure business
deals, which rule out the cultivated mixture of cultural notions and social frameworks
apparent in the beginning (Hood 1996: 221). Managers may opt for congenial, prescriptive
solutions and retreat into fixed technologies rather than more stressful and ‘nitty-gritty’
actions in difficult social interactions (Hood 2000).
The above indicates that, over time, the company adopted various organisational tools to
shape its relationship with growers. Growers, of course, did not readily accept the
organisational visions accompanying interventions in the scheme. Hence, this study exposes
divergences in conflicting perspectives on organisational activity. The company’s emphasis
on technical and rational behaviour denies the social origin of co-ordination and productive
activities in a division of labour (cf. Douglas 1987). Imposing one form of organisational
activity forges a new identity and new modes of social engagement. But not all disagreements
can be handled through bargaining over differences by free contractors, or though forcing
growers into a framework of hierarchical control. Various contingencies and ruptures
impacted upon the common ground prepared at the start of the scheme. Over time, and as a
result of several interventions, organisational life in the scheme moved away from
partnership in a business venture and gradually tended towards intensified bureaucratisation
accompanied by enforced lines of authority. 
Contracting schemes cannot escape the consequences of institutional diversity. Companies
and farmers both think socially, but they also think differently. This is a process of both co-
operation and contest in which achieved results are significantly different from what the
company planners assumed or would have liked them to be. If, as Douglas (1987) insists, the
institution thinks, then in the case of contract farming, it is inherently of two minds.
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Notes
                                                
1 For more studies of the regional political economy in Southern Mindanao I refer to: McCoy 1982; Beckett 1982,
1994; Ileto 1971; Tan 1995; Paderanga 1995; Azurin 1996; Pelzer 1948; Muslim 1994; Hayami et al 1990.
2 Literature on contract growing suggests that forms of resistance and negotiation seem to be individual,
fragmented and unorganised (Little and Watts 1994, MacKintosh 1989). The contract remains a source of tactical
resistance for the growers, as is indicated by diversion of inputs or abuse of labour advances (Watts 1994). The
danger of this argument is that it treats farmer responses all in terms of individual actions. In contrast, we want to
explore whether growers’ strategies also reflect other forms of solidarity or reveal subtle cultural renegotiations of
the agreement. This objective is rooted in the observation that growers have different appraisals of how to act,
and, consequently, how to see the relation with, and their dependence on, the company.
3 Other growers, however, complained about the inaccessibility of the company compound: “We have to wear
shoes to enter the office, otherwise you will be sent back by the company guards to the gate. Therefore, we have
to borrow shoes from our neighbours. Furthermore, many of the negotiations are directly with the General
Manager, so you have to voice out in English”.
According to Pertierra (1988: 186/7): “A dominant idiom such as English limits the ability of peasants to assert
and justify their discursive claims. Internal political relations are less marked by power differential and are more
characterised by normative interests. In this latter context, utterances depend more on their content for their
value and there is a corresponding tendency to employ discursive models using the rich vernaculars”.
4 Scott observes a similar outcome of changing relations in Malaysia: “Although older patron-client bonds may
lose legitimacy, new vertical links may loin peasants to politicians, office-holders, or rural bosses and provide
many of the essential services of the older relationship” (Scott, 1972: 6, emphasis added)
5 In Korovkin’s study (1992) individual producers signed the contract, but the terms were negotiated collectively.
Due to absence of landlords, fruit companies and government credit agencies developed into a new and
important centre of local power. However, they had to confront organised contract growers, mostly of peasant
origin, who were able to defend their collective interest.
6 The outcome of budget cuts and the reduced subsistence allowance was less dramatic for well-off farmers
compared to financially weak farmers. However, the company’s review process was not discriminatory along
these lines: big landlords, as well as small farmers were dumped. Farmers capable of containing costs and
improving quality were likely to prosper despite the enforcement of budgetary control. Farmers who had spent the
profits from asparagus growing for purchasing consumption goods, such as motorcycles, were highly dependent
on the offers made by the company. Others, who had invested profits in new farms or other businesses, had a
sounder base to negotiate new terms introduced in the scheme.
7 A similar dichotomy is presented by Bernal’s analysis (1997) of the colonial Gezira scheme in Sudan. In this
scheme, colonisers created a subordinate and dependent population of farmers, while, simultaneously, they
represented and treated farmers as if they were free agents, or ‘partners’, to whom the benefits of scientific
methods and corporate opportunities were extended.
8 One of the Muslim brokers said: “Labourers will be hurt by abandonment. A farmers will retain the land; they will
lose their jobs”. After a series of conflicts and cases of abandonment, it was rumoured that in some villages
militant and armed Muslim groups were recruiting jobless farm workers.
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